The Right Leader? A Look at How the Different Conservative Leadership Candidates Did in Different Ridings (Part One)

A couple of months ago the Conservatives chose Andrew Scheer as their new leader. They did so using an electoral system that gave equal weight to Conservative members across all ridings. In the leadership race, candidates received points based on the percentage of vote that they won in each riding. Candidates were eliminated until one, Scheer, had won at least 50% of the available points. This system is designed to ensure that the leader the party chooses has support across the country, not just in Conservative strong-holds. An examination of where Scheer won votes shows that he did better in ridings that were more Conservative than in ridings that were less Conservative. At the same time, he was still more popular than his closes rival, Maxime Bernier, in the ridings that were swing ridings for the Conservatives in the last two elections.

The two graphs below show the percentage of the vote that Andrew Scheer won in each riding on the final ballot count (which included just Scheer and Bernier) compared to the margin of Conservative victory or defeat in 2015 and to the average Conservative margin in 2015 and 2011. Both graphs show that as the Conservative margin of victory increases, so does support for Scheer. Initially one might see this as concerning for the Conservatives. To win an election, the party needs to reach beyond their base of support and win votes in ridings that they lost in 2015. Electing a leader with support primarily in safe seats could limit their ability to do that.

Support for Scheer on the Second Ballot (2015)

Support for Scheer on the Second Ballot (2015:2011 Average)

The upward sloping relationship between Scheer support and Conservative margin of victory is less of a concern if one looks just at the ridings that have a Conservative margin of victory around 0. These are the crucial swing ridings that Conservative have to win if they are to get back into government in 2019. In these ridings Scheer performs remarkably well. The trend line in his support crosses the 50% mark very close to the point at which the Conservative margin of victory goes from positive to negative, suggesting that round half of voters in such ridings preferred Scheer to Bernier.   The large number of ridings in and around 0 with respect to the Conservative margin of victory in which Scheer had more than 50% of support on the last ballot also suggests there are a substantial number of close ridings in which Scheer had a great deal of support. While the graphs show that Scheer is more popular in Conservative strongholds than in the rest of the country, they also suggest that he is reasonably popular amongst Conservatives in swing ridings as well.

Bernier’s support follows the opposite trend. The larger the Conservative margin of victory, the worse Bernier did on the final ballot. The trends in both the graph that looks at 2015 and the graph that averages 2015 and 2011 show that Bernier did the best in ridings where the Conservatives did the worst. This may not, however, suggest, that Bernier has a better ability to expand Conservative support to new ridings than Scheer. The ridings in which Bernier did the best are ridings where the Conservatives lost in 2015 and in 2011 by quite large margins. He does ok in the swing ridings clustered around a margin of victory of 0, but there is no indication that he did any better than Scheer. While Bernier is unlikely to alienate Conservatives in swing ridings, it does not appear that he is particularly popular amongst them either.

Support for Bernier on the Second Ballot (2015 Average)

Support for Bernier on the Second Ballot (2015:2011 Average)

The strength of Scheer in safe Conservative ridings and swing ridings is confirmed when one looks at average support in both sets of ridings. The two graphs below show the average support for Bernier, Scheer, and a few of the other stronger candidates in ridings where the Conservatives won by at least 10 percentage points in 2015 and in ridings where the Conservatives averaged a 10% percentage point win between the 2015 and 2011 elections. While Bernier led after the first ballot count in both groups of ridings, when he was competing against only Scheer on the final ballot, he lost by an average of just over 10 percentage points.

Support in Ridings Won by 10% or More (2015)

Support in Ridings Won by 10% or More (2015:2011 Average)

Bernier did better in swing ridings (defined here as ridings where the margin of victory for the Conservatives was between -10% and 10%), but still lost to Scheer by a substantial margin on the final count. Rather than the gap between the two candidates in these ridings being 10 percentage points, it was 5. These graphs make clear that Bernier was able to make the race for leadership close because of his strong support in ridings that Conservatives lost by substantial margins in 2015 and 2011. In ridings where the Conservatives have strong support, or where the Conservatives where competitive, Scheer was the preferred candidate.

Average Support in Close Ridings (2015)

Average Support in Close Ridings (2011:2015 Average)

One should take these analyses with a grain of salt. Having strong support amongst Conservatives in a riding does not necessarily mean that a candidate will be able to win over non-Conservative voters in the riding. It will be interesting to see whether Scheer will be able to turn his support in the leadership race in close ridings into support for the Conservatives in the next election. Support in the leadership race, however, should matter to the 2019 election. Leadership candidates have to build organizations in ridings to win votes, sign up new members who they hope will not only support them in the leadership race but in the general election as well, and motivate Conservative supporters to volunteer and to vote in the general election. The results of the leadership race suggest, that when it comes to swing ridings, Scheer is in a slightly better position to do these things than Bernier is.

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How Much of the Election Could Green Voters Have Changed?

In the wake of a very close election in BC it is worth considering the effect that strategic voting might have had. The rise of the Green party had many leftists in the province concerned that the Greens and NDP might split the vote and allow the Liberals to win several ridings. After the election, it is possible to check to see which ridings might have changed parties had there been more or less strategic voting. A look at the results shows that, because the election was so close, strategic voting could have changed the result. It is important, however, not to overstate strategic voting’s impact. Had the seat difference between the Liberals and NDP been in the range of 5-10 seats, it is unlikely that such voting would have mattered.

The first question that arises with respect to strategic voting, is whether the NDP could have taken more seats from the Liberals had more Green supporters switched their support to the NDP. To test this, I looked at the percentage of Green voters that would have needed to move to the NDP in order for the NDP to match the Liberals’ vote percentage in any particular riding. When doing this I assume that the remaining Green voters stick with the Green party.

The graph below shows that a large number of Green voters would have had to move to the NDP in order to have anything more than a minimal impact on the number of seats that Liberals won. The NDP would have added only two seats to their total had 20% of Green voters switched to them, and only 3 more seats had 40% switched. In addition to this, Green switching to the NDP would have increased the safety of two ridings, Coutney Comox and Mission Maple Ridge, that the NDP barely won and which could switch to the Liberals after absentee ballots are counted or after a re-count. The NDP would have had to win 80% of the Green vote in order to flip 10 seats. For this to happen, the overwhelming majority of Green voters would have had to both prefer the NDP to the Liberals and would have had to decided to vote strategically.

Green Vote Needed to Increase NDP Seats

It is also worth considering the impact that individuals who strategically voted in this election might have had. To do this I looked at the number of NDP seats that the party would have lost had various percentages of NDP voters chosen to vote for the Greens instead.

This analysis also shows that strategic voting had a limited impact on the result. If the NDP lost 5% of its vote, it would only lose two seats. These are the two extremely close seats that may still change hands when absentee votes are counted, Courtney Comox and Mission Maple Ridge. If the NDP lost 10% of its vote, it would lose 3 seats, and if it lost 20% of its vote it would lose 8 seats. If 20%-30% of the NDP vote came from Greens voting strategically, strategic voting affected a large number of seats in this election. Otherwise, Green strategic voting only affected the outcome in couple of seats.

Seats the NDP Would Lose if Their Voters Switched

Because this election was so close, even things that had a small effect on election results mattered. When one or two seats that are decided by less than 1 percentage point make the difference between a majority and a minority government there are a large number of things that affect an election. In such a close race, strategic voting in close ridings matters. In Courtney Comox, Mission Maple Ridge, Coquitlam Burke Mountain, Richmond Queensborough, Vancouver False Creek, and Fraser Nicola the decision over whether to strategic vote mattered. In most other ridings, however, it likely did not.

This has two major implications. First, voters should be very careful to check the competitiveness of their ridings before strategically voting. In a close election, a strategic vote in a close riding can have a critical impact on the election result. In most ridings, however, a strategic voter may not be getting much out of such a vote. Second, moving to an electoral system such as a ranked ballot or run-off that allows voters to, in effect, cast a sincere and a strategic vote (by expressing multiple preferences on her ballot) are unlikely to change election results all that much. Unless 30% of NDP voters are actually Green supporters strategically voting for the NDP, there are few ridings where the Greens would be competitive under a ranked ballot or run-off system. Strategic voting is not a magic bullet that can fix the disproportionality of first past the post electoral system, nor is it a powerful force denying smaller parties like the Greens seats.

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A Divided Electorate: Even though the Overall BC Result was Close, Few Ridings Were

The 2017 BC election was very close, so much so, that it is still unclear as to whether Liberals have won a majority or whether the province is in a minority situation. Absentee ballots from close ridings such as Courtney-Comox and Maple Ridge Mission will determine whether the Liberals will win the 44 seats needed for a majority. There is a paradox in this election’s results though. Despite the fact that the overall race was very close, few ridings were. This election had more uncompetitive ridings (where the margin victory was greater that 10 percentage points) than the 2013, 2009, or 2005 elections. This highlights a problem in BC politics as it gives politicians an incentive to narrow the focus of their campaigns to a small proportion of the electorate.

The graph below shows the percentage of all ridings that were competitive in each of the last four elections in BC. The blue bars show the percentage of ridings where the difference between the first and second place candidates was 5 percentage points or less and the red bars the percentage of ridings where it was 10 percentage points or less. It is remarkable, that if the current results hold, only 8 percent of ridings (7 total) were decided by a 5 percentage point margin. This was the case even though the rise of the Green party threatened to make several previously safe NDP seats on Vancouver Island competitive. Three of these ridings were very close. Coquitlam Burke Mountain, Courtney Comox, and Maple Ridge Mission have margins that are currently within 1 percentage point, and the winner in these ridings may change after absentee votes are counted or after a re-count. Richmond Queensborough, Vancouver False Creek, Fraser-Nicola, and Vancouver Fraserview were also had margins of five percentage points or less on election night. The margin of victory in most other ridings, however, was fairly substantial

BC Competitive Ridings

The large number of ridings that are uncompetitive is concerning. Parties have incentives to tailor both their campaigns and their policies to competitive ridings. A party has little incentive to be highly responsive to the interests of individuals in ridings it has no chance of winning. Similarly, a party has a reduced incentive to take into account the interests of those who live in ridings that it is almost certain to win. Increasing one’s margin of victory in a safe seat has no impact on a party’s strength in the legislature. As the number of competitive ridings becomes smaller, parties have an increasing incentive to narrow the focus of their campaigns and policies to the few ridings that will determine the outcome of the election. This leaves more and more voters’ interests unaccounted for. In particularly close elections like this one, where a few very close ridings can determine who forms government, parties’ campaigns can end up being highly targeted at swing ridings. This hurts the representation of voters who live in safe seats.

An examination of where competitive ridings are in the province highlights how this can be problematic. The graph below shows the percentage of races in each region that had margins of victory of 5 percentage points or less in different parts of the province*. It demonstrates that there is a great deal of variation in competitiveness across regions. In Burnaby and New Westminster half of the races between 2005 and 2017 had margins of victory of 5 percentage points or less. In Victoria proper (excluding suburbs such as Saanich or Oak Bay), no races in any of the past four elections have been that competitive.

Percent of Ridings With 5% (2005-2017)

When one looks at ridings that had margins of victory of 10 percentage points or less, there is still a great deal of regional imbalance. Suburbs around Vancouver (Burnaby and the area around Coquitlam- PoCoMo in the graph), Chilliwack and Fraser Valley, the ridings surrounding but not in Victoria (Saanich and Oak Bay), as well as the Southern ridings in Vancouver are all reasonably competitive. Other parts of the province such as Langley and Abbotsford, Victoria proper, and the North part of Surrey are almost completely uncompetitive.

Percent of Ridings With 10% (2005-2017)

The distribution of competitive ridings has implications for public debate and policy. Parties have little incentive to emphasize issues and to pass policy that speak to parts of the province that are not competitive. It can be a challenge, for example, to try to get parties to properly address something like the fentanyl crisis when it disproportionately affects uncompetitive seats in the Northeast of Vancouver. In contrast, policies on toll bridges that affect competitive ridings in and around Coquitlam and Maple Ridge can end up getting a great deal of attention. The fewer competitive ridings there are in the province, the more public discourse and public policy will be distorted in favour of those that live in competitive parts of the province.

The drop in the number competitive ridings in the 2017 BC election is concerning. This, coupled with how close the election was, increases the extent to which parties will target their policy commitments towards the interests of those that live in competitive seats. This can lead to problematic policy making that ignores important issues in the province.

* Election data and the ridings that are included in each region are taken from BC pundits guide.

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Strategic Dilemmas: The Anti-Liberal Vote in the BC Election

Polls in the final two weeks of the BC election show a close race, with the difference between the Liberals and NDP within the margin of error. These polls also show a strong Green vote, at between 14% and 24%. The fact that this is a close race with a strong third party raises questions about whether anti-Liberal voters should vote strategically. In some ridings, strategic voting can indeed play an important role in preventing vote splitting and keeping the Liberals from winning seats. There are, however, many ridings in which strategic voting is not likely to affect the election result.

Strategic voting comes at a cost. Voting has both an instrumental and an expressive value. In addition to determining the strength of the different parties in the legislatures, elections provide an indication of parties’ public support. Elections are an opportunity for voters to send a message to politicians about the types of policies they prefer. When individuals vote strategically that message becomes less clear. New Democrat leaders that see large numbers of Green voters switch to their party may take that as an indication that many Greens prefer the NDP platform. As a result, the NDP may feel its policies on issues like the environment are sufficient to capture views of a large number of BC voters.

This has real implications for the policies that parties pursue. A strong Green party sends a signal to both the NDP and the Liberals that the two party’s policies on issues like the environment are insufficient to win the support of a substantial number of voters. The threat that a strong Green party can take votes from a party like the NDP can force the NDP to adopt some of the Green’s policies. If too many Greens vote strategically, the party will look weaker than it actually is and like less of an electoral threat. This reduces the likelihood that the NDP will try to co-opt Green policies. Thus, strategic voting costs voters the ability to send a clear message to the politicians they elect. This is not to say that individuals should never strategic vote, but rather that they should only do so when the impact such a vote has on election results outweighs the costs of such a vote.

Whether a strategic vote is worth the cost, depends on the kind of riding a voter lives in. It makes little sense to vote strategically in a safe riding where the gap between the two largest parties is too big for a shift in Green votes to one party to affect the election result. A large number of ridings in BC fit this description. In 2013, 61 seats (72% of all ridings) were won by a margin of over 10 percentage points. In 2009, which was a closer election, 64 seats (75%) were won by that margin. In these ridings, there are usually not enough strategic voters to change the result, and voters should be wary of casting such a vote.

It also makes little sense to strategically vote in a riding in which the Greens and NDP are competing with each other. In these ridings a vote for the Green party is more likely to lead to the Greens winning a seat than the Liberals winning one. A strategic vote in such a riding does a lot of harm because it could deny the Greens a seat and the ability to influence policy in the legislature. In ridings in the area around Victoria, where the Greens are particularly strong, anti-Liberal strategic voting makes little sense.

Where strategic voting can matter is in ridings that are close races between the Liberals and NDP. These are the cases where a vote for the Greens has a real chance of leading to the election of the Liberals, and where Greens that prefer the NDP to Liberals should consider voting for the NDP. There may be fewer of these ridings that people sometimes believe. In 2013, there were 15 ridings (18%) in which the two strongest parties were separated by 5 percentage points or less (and in one of these ridings all three parties were competitive).  In 2009, there were 19 ridings (22%) that were won by less 5 percentage points or less.

The decision over whether to strategic vote is complicated. Strategic voting can only have an impact on election results in close races, and most ridings are not close races. Individuals considering strategic voting should pay careful attention to the competitiveness of their ridings. Such voting in a safe seat is likely to cost voters their ability to express their views on policy in exchange for little influence over election results.

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The Green Threat (Part 3): Consequences for this Election

In my last two posts, I looked at what a Green surge would mean for the NDP in two scenarios. One where the NDP does as well as they were in April 18th polls, and a second where they did as poorly as in the 2013 election. Both analyses suggested that a Green surge would have a limited impact on the outcomes of the election. The NDP would lose some seats on Vancouver Island, but unless the vast majority of the increase in the Green vote comes as a result of NDP defections, in neither scenario do the Liberals pick up a substantial number of seats. This is not to say that a Green surge cannot contribute to a Liberal victory, but rather, that it will only do so if the election is already very close. Potential strategic voters should be aware of this when deciding how to approach this election.

The first danger that the NDP faces is that the Green party will win enough seats to deny them a majority in spite of a win over the Liberals. The previous posts suggest that this is unlikely to happen. Neither suggests that the Green party is likely to take more the 10 seats (all on Vancouver Island from the NDP). Indeed, most election forecasters would likely be surprised if the Green party managed to take that many. Yet, only three times since 1945 (1952, 1979, and 1996) has the difference between first and second in a BC election been less than 10 seats. One of those elections, in 1952, used a different electoral system and another, in 1996, saw the party with the second most votes win the most seats. BC’s first past the post system tends to give whichever party wins the plurality of the vote a healthy advantage over the second place party. If the NDP defeats the Liberals by a substantial margin, it is unlikely that loosing a handful of seats on Vancouver Island will prevent them from forming a government.

It is also worth considering the danger that voters switching to the Green party will allow the Liberal party to win seats by splitting the anti-Liberal vote. The last two posts suggest that, while this certainly matters in some ridings, defections from the NDP to Greens are unlikely to affect the outcome of most ridings. Where the Greens are strongest, on Vancouver Island, they tend to be stronger than the Liberal party. In most ridings on the Island, defections from the NDP to the Greens are more likely to a Green victory than a Liberal one. Many seats off the Island are either safe Liberal or NDP seats. In safe seats, the gap between the two parties is too large for a surge in Green support to take enough votes from the NDP to give the Liberals the riding.

It is important to note that in highly competitive seats, particularly those that the NDP are trying to take from the Liberals, a Green surge may end up costing the NDP seats. There is thus some merit to anti-Liberal strategic voting in some parts of the province. Anti-Liberal voters in ridings that have historically been close, or where it looks like a New Democrat might be able to unseat a Liberal, should consider backing the NDP. It is unlikely, however, that most voters live in those kinds of close ridings. Anti-Liberal voters in safe ridings should not be concerned that a vote for the Green party will hand the Liberals an extra seat.

There are two important points from previous posts that should be highlighted. The first is that the election needs to be very close for the growth in Green support to have an impact on the result. It is very possible that it will be that close. The NDP have only won the popular vote in the province twice (in 1996 they won a third election despite losing the popular vote). Even though they are leading in the polls, the NDP has to deal with the fact that they are fighting an election in a province where historically most voters have supported other parties. This does not mean that one should discount the likelihood of NDP victory, but one should also not be surprised if the election ends up being closer than the polls currently predict.

The second important point is that strategic voting is a lot less likely to have an impact on the election than is often assumed. In certain, very competitive ridings, strategic voting can affect which party wins. In a large number of ridings, however, the margins between the two strongest parties are simply to big for strategic voting to change anything. In these ridings, anti-Liberal voters ought to back the party they prefer regardless of which one is stronger. They should pay careful attention to the competitiveness of their ridings when deciding whether or not to vote strategically.

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The Green Threat (Part 2): A Green Surge Would Have Changed Little in the 2013 Election

In my last post, I looked at how the rise of the BC Greens might affect the NDP if they manage to hold on to their current levels of support. Polls in British Columbia are not always as reliable as one would hope, and with the main leadership debate still to come, there is plenty of time for the polls to change. In this post, I will look at what would have happened if a Green surge similar to the one happening now occurred in 2013. Where in my last post I looked at what would have happened had the parties had their current poll numbers, in this post I look at what would have happened had the Liberals and NDP won vote shares similar to their 2013 numbers. Together, these posts provide a sense of the possible outcomes of two different scenarios. This one provides a look at a case where the Liberals are ahead by a substantial margin and the last post a scenario where the NDP has a slight lead. A Green surge in the last election would have changed very little.

To look at the impact a rise in the Green vote I use April 18, 2017 polling data from CBC’s poll tracker to estimate party’s vote shares in each riding. Rather than estimating the support for the Liberals and NDP though, I take their 2013 results as is. I consider two scenarios when reducing Liberal and NDP support to account for Green growth. First, I consider a scenario where the Greens get 60% of their increase from the NDP and 40% of their increase from the Liberals. Second, I consider a scenario where the Greens get 80% of their increase in support from the NDP and 20% from the Liberals. This takes into account two different cases, one where the Greens draw only a slightly higher share of their increase from traditional NDP supporters and a second where the overwhelming majority of Green growth comes at the expense of the NDP. As in the previous post, it is important to note that these are crude estimates. They are designed to demonstrate the potential impact of a rise in Green support on the other parties, not to give a definitive account of which parties would have won which exact seats.

In the first scenario, the effect of the rise in Green support is small and largely confined to Vancouver Island. When only 60% of the growth in Green support comes at the expense of the NDP, only 5 seats change hands. Only one of those, in Burnaby/Coquitlam, is not on the Island. In this scenario, there are also 8 seats whose competitiveness changes. These seats either go from being safe seats (the winner no longer has a 5 percentage point lead over the second place finisher) to competitive ones, or from competitive to safe seats. All of these seats are on the Island (the riding in Burnaby Coquitlam was competitive both before and after the rise in Green support was estimated).

Seat Changes Due to Growth in Green Support (2013 Result)

The impact of the Greens is more significant in the scenario where they draw 80% of their increase in support from the NDP. Under these circumstances, 9 seats (or 11% of the BC legislature at the time) would change parties. Again, these changes are largely confined to Vancouver Island. Only two seats off the Island (both in Burnaby/Coquitlam) would have elected a different MLA. A substantial number of seats, 14, would see a change in competitiveness, though most of those would also be on Vancouver Island.

The likelihood that a Green surge would lead to the NDP losing a large number of seats to a Liberal party taking advantage of vote splitting is also limited. Of the 5 seats that the NDP would lose if the Green party got 60% of their increase from the NDP, 4 would be won by the Green party. The Liberals would take only the seat in Burnaby/Coquitlam. If the 80% of the Green rise would have come from the NDP, the Liberals would take an additional two seats. There would also be two tied races, one between the Greens and the NDP, and one between the Greens, Liberals, and NDP. In both scenarios, the Greens and not the Liberals are the main beneficiaries of a rise in Green support.

Gains by Parties Due to Green Growth

Had the Green surge that is happening now occurred in 2013, not much would have changed. Vancouver Island would have elected more Green MLAs, and would have been more competitive, but for the most part, the rest of the province would have elected the same candidates. This is not to say that a rise in Green support cannot work to the advantage of the Liberals, but the Liberals and NDP have to very close in support in order for that to happen. In 2013, the gap between the two major parties was large enough that a rise in Green support would have had a relatively small impact on the election result.

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The Green Threat (Part 1): 2017 Polling Numbers suggest the Greens are Unlikely to Prevent an NDP Victory

Polling in the BC election is showing a remarkable increase in support for the provincial Green party.   The party that won less than 9% of the vote in 2013 and 2009 is now polling at around 20% across the province and over 30% on Vancouver Island. The potential for the Greens to significantly increase their vote raises important questions about what effect a Green surge would have on the NDP. If the Greens draw large numbers of left wing voters to them, vote splitting between them and the NDP could allow the Liberal party to pick up significant numbers of seats. It is thus important to examine where the Green party is having success, and test the its potential impact on NDP electoral prospects. In this post, I look at what would have happened in 2013 had polling numbers been where they were April 18, 2017.  If the NDP can establish a solid lead over the Liberals, they should be protected from a Green surge. In a close election, however, a strong Green party is likely to be a problem for the NDP.

To examine the impact of the Green surge I compared aggregate polling data from CBC’s Poll Tracker to the results for the 2013 election. I looked at the numbers the tracker has estimated for three regions (Metro Vancouver, Vancouver Island, and the North/Interior) and compared them to the results the party received in 2013. I then adjusted the riding scores to account for the difference between 2013 and current polling numbers. For example, if a party is polling 5 percentage points above where they were in 2013 in Vancouver, I would add 5 percentage points to the parties’ vote percentage from 2013 in Vancouver ridings. This is a very crude measure of party support in different ridings. Unfortunately, however, without riding level polling, it is impossible to account for how popular opinion is spread across ridings in a particular part of the province. I classified ridings as safe if the gap between the first and second place party was more than 5% and competitive if the gap was less than 5%. For the 2017 numbers (though not for 2013) I also count any riding that looks would switch parties as unsafe, even if it looks like the margin between first and second place is higher than 5 percentage points. I do this because of the uncertainty surrounding polling, I am more confident in the 2013 analysis that uses actual election results. It is finally important to note that there has been redistricting between the 2013 and 2017 elections. This means that predictions for individual ridings for 2013 will not necessarily be accurate for 2017. This analysis can provide a general sense of where the election is competitive, but the exact numbers presented should be taken with a grain of salt.

A look at the 2013 results shows that the Liberals had a large number of safe seats. Of the 49 seats the Liberals won in 2013, 40 were by more than 5 percentage points. In contrast, the NDP won by more than 5 percentage points in only 26 seats, and the two parties were within 5 points of each other in 16 seats. The Greens were largely a non-factor. They won one seat in Victoria by a fairly margin and were competitive with both the Liberals and NDP in another.

2013 Safe Seats by Party

Adjusting to match 2017 polling numbers shows some remarkable changes. The Green party is somewhat more significant. It still has only one safe seat, but the 2017 numbers would have been made the Green party competitive with the NDP in 6 seats and competitive with both the Liberals and NDP in an additional one. The big change, however, is the number of seats in which the Liberals and NDP would have ended up competing against each other. There are 31 seats in which 2017 polling numbers would have put the Liberals and NDP within 5 percentage points of each other or in which the 2017 number would have changed the party that won. The NDP would have only needed to win 14 of these seats (in addition to holding on to their 29 safe seats) in order to win a majority government. In these 31 competitive seats, the NDP would lead the Liberals by an average of 42% to 38% and would have had the highest predicted vote share in 17. These number suggested that if the 2013 election had finished with the numbers the parties are polling at today, the surge in Green support would not have prevented the NDP from winning a majority.

Seats that Would Have Been Competitive with 2017 Numbers

An examination of how this would have broken down regionally demonstrates that the Green threat is generally limited to Vancouver Island. In the Capital Region (Victoria and the surrounding area), the NDP would have had no safe seats, and would have had to compete with the Green party to win each of the 4/5 seats it won in 2013. Off the Island though, the NDP has significant numbers of safe seats in the regions were the Greens are most likely to be competitive in Vancouver and Burnaby. The bigger gains to be made by the NDP are in areas where the Green party is weakest, Northern and Interior British Columbia, and the suburbs around Vancouver.

Seats that Would Have Changed Hands by Region

New Democrats should be concerned by the regional distribution of seats they would need to take from the Liberals in order to compensate for losses to the Greens. They would have to pick up competitive seats in regions such as the North Shore, Richmond/Delta, Langley/Abbotsford, and the Okanagan, where they have been historically weak. The party would also have to do well in Central British Columbia, a region where the Liberals have had an average lead of 8 percentage points over them in elections between 1991 and 2013. Even though aggregated numbers suggest that the NDP would have been able to survive a Green surge, doing so requires the party to have success in areas of the province where they have struggled in the past. As such, the rise of the Greens presents the party with a significant threat.

A Green surge would have a decisive impact on an election in two scenarios, both opf which are ver plausible. The first is a situation in which the NDP and Liberal seat shares end up being quite close. In this case, losses on Vancouver Island may keep the NDP from forming the government. The second, is a scenario in which the Liberals and NDP numbers end up converging, and even the small numbers of voters that the Greens might pull from the NDP in the Interior and suburbs of Vancouver could allow the Liberals to win those seats. In this vein, it is important to note polls have the NDP and Liberals within the margin or error of each other, and that a significant number of the competitive seats are in areas of the province that have been traditionally Liberal. In a close election, a Green surge may prevent an NDP victory, and this very well may be a close election. At the same time, if the NDP can win with a 4 or 5 percentage point lead over the Liberals, they should be able to protect themselves from losing as a result of vote splitting with the Greens.

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