The Moderates, the Social Conservative, and the Far-Right Candidate: A Look at How the Different Conservative Leadership Candidates did in Different Ridings (Part 2)

The Conservative party’s leadership race produced two significant candidates whose extreme views are likely to concern progressives. On one hand, Kellie Leitch’s anti-immigrant rhetoric scared many into believing that the far-right anti-immigrant movements that have been on the rise in Europe and North America were making their way to Canada. On the other hand, Brad Trost raised concerns about the potential for the strong social conservatives that had a great deal of influence over the Reform party and Canadian Alliance would start to influence the Conservatives. In contrast, Michael Chong’s centrist campaign attracted the support of many progressives seeking to influence the race, while Erin O’Toole ran a campaign that was more conservative than Chong, but less extreme than Leitch or Trost.

In my last post I looked at how the two strongest candidates, Andrew Scheer and Maxime Bernier, fared in the swing ridings the Conservatives will need to win if they want to get back into government. In the post I will compare Leitch, Trost, Chong, and O’Toole’s results in these ridings. This comparison can provide some indication of which of the weaker candidates Scheer should make a special effort to include within the party leadership. Like with the last post, it is important to remember that the general electorate will be very different than the electorate that voted in the leadership race. At the same time, the leadership race results can give some indication of which candidates are better organized and in a better place to deliver votes in the ridings that are likely to determine the next election results. A look at the different candidates’ success suggest that O’Toole and, to a lesser extent, Trost, are the stronger candidates in swing ridings.

The graphs below show the relationship between the support each of the four candidates won in the leadership race and the Conservative margin of victory or defeat in 2015 (the first graph) or average margin between the 2015 and 2011 elections (the second graph). While Chong and Leitch do the best in ridings that Conservatives did the worst in, their support drops quite quickly as the Conservatives get closer to winning a riding. In both the graph that looks at the 2015 margin and the graph that looks at the average margin O’Toole is the strongest candidate by the point at which Conservatives are within at least 25 percentage points of winning a riding. Brad Trost moves to being the second strongest of the four shortly after. Both Chong and Leitch are especially weak in the ridings in which the Conservatives had the largest margins of victory.

Relationship Between 2015 Margin and First Ballot Vote

Relationship Between Average Margin and First Ballot Vote

That Chong and Leitch did so poorly in both competitive ridings and Conservative strongholds suggests that, while they were able to generate a lot of news coverage, they were not able to build strong bases of support in the ridings that the Conservatives need to win elections. This suggests that the inclusion of both O’Toole and Trost in key leadership positions is more important to success than the inclusion of Chong and Leitch. Chong’s moderate campaign, while it caught on with progressives, failed to win over many Conservatives in swing ridings or strong holds. Leitch’s anti-immigrant rhetoric also failed to gain traction with these voters.

It is particularly worth looking at the different levels of support the Leitch and Trost were able to win. As an anti-immigrant candidate, Leitch represents the nationalist conservativism that is rapidly growing in much Europe and the United States, while Trost represents a more traditional social conservativism, which has been common in past conservative parties in Canada such as the Reform party or Canadian Alliance.

The two graphs below show that Trost’s social conservativism is more popular in swing ridings and conservative strong holds that Leitch’s anti-immigrant conservativism. Each red x represents Trost’s support in a riding in the first leadership ballot while each green x represents Leitch’s support. In both the graph that looks at 2015 margins and the graph the looks at the average 2015 and 2011 margin, there are far more red xs in the top middle of the graphs than green xs. This indicates that there are a large number of close ridings in which Trost did well in the leadership race than ridings in which Leitch did well.

Support for Leitch and Trost on the First Ballot (2015 Margins)

Support for Leitch and Trost on the First Ballot (Avg Margins)

In my last post I wrote about how, despite the close race for leadership, Andrew Scheer, had been stronger than Maxime Bernier in the swing ridings that the Conservatives need to win in order win future elections. Of the next four candidates, it appears that O’Toole and Trost are the strongest candidates in swing ridings. Both of these results bode well for moderate and traditional Conservatives in Canada. Compared to Bernier’s libertarian candidacy, Scheer’s looked very similar to Stephen Harper’s. Amongst the other four candidates, the more moderately conservative O’Toole and socially conservative Trost did significantly better than the very centrist Chong or the anti-immigrant Leitch. These results suggest that in swing ridings and Conservative strongholds the next Conservative campaign will look a lot like previous campaigns and that the strong anti-immigrant rhetoric of Leitch’s campaign and the centrism of Chong’s will have a less prominent role in Conservative politics.

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The Right Leader? A Look at How the Different Conservative Leadership Candidates Did in Different Ridings (Part One)

A couple of months ago the Conservatives chose Andrew Scheer as their new leader. They did so using an electoral system that gave equal weight to Conservative members across all ridings. In the leadership race, candidates received points based on the percentage of vote that they won in each riding. Candidates were eliminated until one, Scheer, had won at least 50% of the available points. This system is designed to ensure that the leader the party chooses has support across the country, not just in Conservative strong-holds. An examination of where Scheer won votes shows that he did better in ridings that were more Conservative than in ridings that were less Conservative. At the same time, he was still more popular than his closes rival, Maxime Bernier, in the ridings that were swing ridings for the Conservatives in the last two elections.

The two graphs below show the percentage of the vote that Andrew Scheer won in each riding on the final ballot count (which included just Scheer and Bernier) compared to the margin of Conservative victory or defeat in 2015 and to the average Conservative margin in 2015 and 2011. Both graphs show that as the Conservative margin of victory increases, so does support for Scheer. Initially one might see this as concerning for the Conservatives. To win an election, the party needs to reach beyond their base of support and win votes in ridings that they lost in 2015. Electing a leader with support primarily in safe seats could limit their ability to do that.

Support for Scheer on the Second Ballot (2015)

Support for Scheer on the Second Ballot (2015:2011 Average)

The upward sloping relationship between Scheer support and Conservative margin of victory is less of a concern if one looks just at the ridings that have a Conservative margin of victory around 0. These are the crucial swing ridings that Conservative have to win if they are to get back into government in 2019. In these ridings Scheer performs remarkably well. The trend line in his support crosses the 50% mark very close to the point at which the Conservative margin of victory goes from positive to negative, suggesting that round half of voters in such ridings preferred Scheer to Bernier.   The large number of ridings in and around 0 with respect to the Conservative margin of victory in which Scheer had more than 50% of support on the last ballot also suggests there are a substantial number of close ridings in which Scheer had a great deal of support. While the graphs show that Scheer is more popular in Conservative strongholds than in the rest of the country, they also suggest that he is reasonably popular amongst Conservatives in swing ridings as well.

Bernier’s support follows the opposite trend. The larger the Conservative margin of victory, the worse Bernier did on the final ballot. The trends in both the graph that looks at 2015 and the graph that averages 2015 and 2011 show that Bernier did the best in ridings where the Conservatives did the worst. This may not, however, suggest, that Bernier has a better ability to expand Conservative support to new ridings than Scheer. The ridings in which Bernier did the best are ridings where the Conservatives lost in 2015 and in 2011 by quite large margins. He does ok in the swing ridings clustered around a margin of victory of 0, but there is no indication that he did any better than Scheer. While Bernier is unlikely to alienate Conservatives in swing ridings, it does not appear that he is particularly popular amongst them either.

Support for Bernier on the Second Ballot (2015 Average)

Support for Bernier on the Second Ballot (2015:2011 Average)

The strength of Scheer in safe Conservative ridings and swing ridings is confirmed when one looks at average support in both sets of ridings. The two graphs below show the average support for Bernier, Scheer, and a few of the other stronger candidates in ridings where the Conservatives won by at least 10 percentage points in 2015 and in ridings where the Conservatives averaged a 10% percentage point win between the 2015 and 2011 elections. While Bernier led after the first ballot count in both groups of ridings, when he was competing against only Scheer on the final ballot, he lost by an average of just over 10 percentage points.

Support in Ridings Won by 10% or More (2015)

Support in Ridings Won by 10% or More (2015:2011 Average)

Bernier did better in swing ridings (defined here as ridings where the margin of victory for the Conservatives was between -10% and 10%), but still lost to Scheer by a substantial margin on the final count. Rather than the gap between the two candidates in these ridings being 10 percentage points, it was 5. These graphs make clear that Bernier was able to make the race for leadership close because of his strong support in ridings that Conservatives lost by substantial margins in 2015 and 2011. In ridings where the Conservatives have strong support, or where the Conservatives where competitive, Scheer was the preferred candidate.

Average Support in Close Ridings (2015)

Average Support in Close Ridings (2011:2015 Average)

One should take these analyses with a grain of salt. Having strong support amongst Conservatives in a riding does not necessarily mean that a candidate will be able to win over non-Conservative voters in the riding. It will be interesting to see whether Scheer will be able to turn his support in the leadership race in close ridings into support for the Conservatives in the next election. Support in the leadership race, however, should matter to the 2019 election. Leadership candidates have to build organizations in ridings to win votes, sign up new members who they hope will not only support them in the leadership race but in the general election as well, and motivate Conservative supporters to volunteer and to vote in the general election. The results of the leadership race suggest, that when it comes to swing ridings, Scheer is in a slightly better position to do these things than Bernier is.

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Emphasis Matters: Islamophobia should be Included in Parliament’s Anti-Racism Motion

February 15th saw debate on a motion put forward by Liberal MP Iqra Khalid to condemn Islamophobia and other forms of religious discrimination and to request the Standing Committee on Canadian heritage study the matter (the full wording is here). This motion, supported by Liberals and New Democrats, has attracted criticism from some Conservative MPs. Several Conservatives, including leadership candidates Kellie Leitch and Andrew Scheer, have argued that the motion is a threat to freedom of speech and singles out one religion. Highlighting their objection to the use of the term “Islamophobia,” Conservative MP David Anderson has introduced his own motion that is essentially the same as the original one, but removes the word Islamophobia. In the wake of the attack in Quebec, and the increasing Islamophobic rhetoric associated with Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, it makes sense to include a reference to Islamophobia. Doing so does not threaten Canadians’ freedom of speech nor does it preference one religion over others. Rather, it ensures the motion responds to troubling events that have occurred in Canada and around the world.

It is first worth grappling with the argument that this limits freedom of speech. Several Conservatives have argued that the term Islamophobia could be extended to include not just hatred and discrimination against Islam, but legitimate criticism that occurs as part of religious debate. This argument relies on a tenuous understanding of the definition of Islamophobia. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (scroll down the link for their definition), the Berkley Centre for Race and Gender, and Georgetown University’s Bridge Initiative all draw clear distinctions between Islamophobia as prejudice and the criticism or questioning of particular tenets of Islam that occurs as part of debate around religion. Reading the term Islamophobia to include all criticism of Islam involves going beyond the definition of the term used by anti-discrimination organizations.

It is further worth noting that Canadian lawmakers and the courts have generally been good at ensuring that anti-racism measures limit freedom of speech as little as possible. Canadian anti-hate speech legislation has been carefully crafted to include only the “wilful” promotion of hatred and carves out an exception “if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed them to be true.” The narrow construction of anti-hate speech laws played a central role in ensuring the Supreme Court did not strike them down as violations of freedom of expression in R. v. Keegstra. If Canadian law-makers and courts had a history of interpreting anti-discrimination provisions in an over-broad manner, there would be reason to be concerned that a motion opposing Islamophobia could develop into restrictions on religious debate. The opposite is true, however. Canadian law-makers and courts have generally interpreted anti-discrimination measures in a way that infringes upon freedom of expression as little as possible. There is no evidence in Canada to suggest that condemnation of hate speech and discrimination leads to slippery slope in which freedom of expression becomes unduly restricted.

On this point, it is finally worth noting that this is a motion and not a bill. A motion expresses an opinion of parliament and does not change law. As a result, this motion does nothing to change any of the existing rules regarding hate speech, discrimination, and freedom of expression in Canada. It does call for study of this issue by the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, which could produce further legislation on the issue. Given the history of Canadian anti-discrimination law discussed above, it seems unlikely that such a committee would develop legislation with over-broad definitions of Islamophobia or discriminatory speech. If such legislation was developed, there would be additional opportunities to vote against it, and it is highly likely the Courts would strike it down as violating the Charter of Rights’ freedom of expression provisions. Concerns that the use of Islamophobia will lead to a condemnation of any criticism of Islam should be allayed by the way that Islamophobia is narrowly defined by anti-discrimination organizations and by the protections of freedom of expression that already exist in Canadian law.

It is also worth tackling many Conservatives’ second claim, that it is inappropriate to single out Islamophobia, in addition to religious discrimination in general, for criticism. The point that critics make here is that highlighting Islamophobia for particular condemnation and study diminishes efforts to condemn discrimination against other religious groups. This argument misses the importance of context to condemnation of discrimination. Condemnation of discrimination is important as a reaction to discrimination that has happened. While broad statements of principle certainly have value, it is important that anti-discrimination measures demonstrate an understanding and a response to particular discriminations that Canadians face. When a group is facing discrimination it is important that the government respond specifically to the discrimination they are facing. This does not preference one group over another, but rather demonstrates an understanding that at different points in time different groups of people will face different levels of discrimination.

In the wake of the shooting at a Mosque in Quebec and the rise in Islamophobia that has coincided with the Donald Trump’s election as President it is important to condem Islamophobia specifically. Muslims are becoming an increasing target of discrimination and so it makes sense that the government would take measures to try to protect them. Far from detracting from the protection of other groups, this kind of action strengthens it. It demonstrates to all minority groups that the government will take action to protect them when they become targets of hate groups. It shows every minority group that governments will respond to increases in discrimination against them, not with a general condemnation of discrimination, but with measures that acknowledge the particularly vulnerability of the group. Condemning Islamophobia today is not only important as a broad statement of principle, it is important as a reaction to events that are currently taking place in Canada and around the world. Motions that ignore the particular discriminations that individuals are facing not only provide little assurance to the group being discriminated against, but should also leave other groups concerned that governments will fail to adequately respond to attacks against them should they happen in the future.

In the aftermath of the Quebec attack it is essential that the Canadian government take a strong stand against Islamophobia particularly. Removing Islamophobia from the motion does harm because it suggests that the government is ignorant of the increasing discrimination that Muslims face. With little reason to fear that the motion will serve as a slippery slope to excessive limitations of freedom of expression, Conservative MPs are wrong to argue for the elimination of Islamophobia from the motion.

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Will the Conservatives Learn From History? Conservatives Need To Reach Out To A Diverse Electorate to Win

The Conservative leadership race has seen the emergence of Kellie Leitch as a candidate who appears to be trying to capitalize on the growing anti-immigrant sentiment across the industrialized world. Leitch’s support of a Canadian-values test for immigrants has raised concerns that the far-right populism that has emerged in European and in the recent American Presidential campaign will influence the Canadian Conservative party. The Conservatives should be careful of Leitch’s candidacy. Throughout Canada’s history, courting immigrants and ethnic minorities has been an important part of the Conservatives’ success. Conservative Prime Ministers John Diefenbaker, Brian Mulroney, and Stephen Harper all made significant efforts to win the support of ethnic minority voters. This is something that Conservatives should keep in mind when they choose their next leader.

Conservative efforts to broaden their appeal to a diverse group of voters date back to the Diefenbaker era. When Diefenbaker took over as leader of the then named Progressive Conservatives, the party’s base of support largely came from Anglophone Protestant voters. Diefenbaker made efforts to extend the party’s appeal to include ethnic minorities such as German-Canadians and Ukrainian-Canadians. He appointed Ukrainian-Canadian Paul Yuzyk to Senate, who would use his first speech in the Senate to advocate for the adoption of multiculturalism. He also appointed the first Ukrainian-Canadian cabinet minister, Michael Starr. Diefenbaker’s own German-Canadian heritage (his father was of German heritage and his mother Scottish) coupled with his efforts to include minorities in his government helped Diefenbaker to increase Progressive Conservative support amongst Eastern European immigrant communities.

The work that Diefenbaker did to appeal to Eastern European minorities paid off for the PCs electorally. Prior to Diefenbaker’s leadership the PCs were weak in Western Canada (which had a large Eastern European population). Between 1908 and 1957 the party only won more than 50% of the seats on the prairies in 1917, the year that Borden was able to campaign as part of a Unionist government in support of conscription. While Diefenbaker won just under 30% of prairie seats in 1957, he would dominate the prairies in subsequent elections. Between 1958 and 1965 the Diefenbaker led PCs never won fewer than 85% of prairie seats. This was not only due to Diefenbaker’s support for minority’s interests, as a Westerner from Saskatchewan Diefenbaker was able to appeal to prairie voters of many ethnic backgrounds. At the same time, the ability to win ethnic minority votes certainly played a role in Diefenbaker’s success.

Brian Mulroney also made a significant effort to appeal to ethnic minorities. In 1988, prior to the election that year, Mulroney increased funding to multiculturalism and passed the Multiculturalism Act. He brought Jewish-Canadian Gerry Weiner into cabinet as Secretary of State of Canada (the multiculturalism portfolio was subsumed within the Secretary of State’s Department). In 1991 Weiner would become the Minister of Multiculturalism and Citizenship as Mulroney created an independent department to oversee the federal government’s multiculturalism program. There was a clear electoral motivation behind Mulroney’s efforts to advance multiculturalism. The party sought to increase the PC’s appeal in the increasingly diverse ridings in urban areas such as Toronto that the party felt would become essential to its electoral success. Weiner said as much at the 1989 PC convention when he made note of the success that the Liberals had in in diverse Toronto ridings and the need of the party to emphasize the party’s commitment to multiculturalism in order to compete in such ridings.*

The 1990s saw the Progressive Conservatives retreat from their support from multiculturalism, in part in response to the rise of the Reform/Canadian Alliance party. After the creation of the Conservatives through the merger of the PCs and the Canadian Alliance, the Conservatives returned to their considerable efforts to reach out to a diverse electorate. In his role as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Jason Kenney made immense efforts to build relationships between the Conservative party and minority cultural communities. His efforts involved a schedule on some weekends that had Kenney attending 20-25 different events in different communities. As part of the effort to increase their support within ethnic minority communities the Conservatives issued an apology for the 1880-1920 head tax on Chinese immigration and pledged to reduce immigrant’s landing fees and increase foreign degree and credential recognition.

The Conservative efforts to win the support of ethnic minorities paid off in 2011. The party won a majority government in part because it was able to win diverse ridings in the Toronto and Vancouver regions such as Bramlea-Gore-Malton, Brampton Springdale, and Vancouver South. Without these ridings the Conservatives would have had difficulty winning a majority. It is notable that the Conservatives ran into trouble in ethnically diverse ridings in 2015 when they campaigned on policies such as a niqab ban in citizenship ceremonies and a “barbaric cultural practices” hotline. The party ended up losing many of the ridings that they had needed to win their majority in 2011.

There is a lesson in this for Conservatives aspiring to return to government. Since WWII the Conservative Party’s success has depended on its ability to reach out to ethnic minorities that have previously not been part of its electoral coalition. Doing so means taking the issues that are important to different minority and immigrant communities, such as multiculturalism and immigration policy, seriously and developing policies that reflect minorities’ interests. For Diefenbaker this meant including representatives from Eastern European cultural minorities in his government. For Mulroney and Harper this has meant supporting multiculturalism and easing the immigration processes. When the Conservatives have retreated from these positions, as the Harper government did after 2011, they have hurt their ability to win the ethnically diverse ridings they need in order to win government. As the Conservatives consider the proposals of leadership candidates such as Kellie Leitch they would do well to remember that they need the votes of immigrants and ethnic minorities if they are going to have any chance at winning an election.

* Hunter, Iain. (August 26, 1989). “Tories Urged to Cash in on Multicultural Policies.” The Ottawa Citizen. A3.

 

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Leadership Dilemmas: The NDP is More Reliant on Quebec, but the Conservatives have Leadership Selection Rules that Give More Weight to the Province

Both the Conservatives and the New Democratic Party are in the midst of leadership races. The Conservatives will choose a new leader this May while the NDP will hold their leadership election in October. These leadership contests will shape Canadian politics for the next couple of years, helping to determine the direction of the two major federal opposition parties. In particular, the leadership races will affect the way that both opposition parties will approach Quebec. The parties have to decide on the extent to which they will challenge the Liberals in that province during the 2019. The choice of a leader with a background in Quebec politics or who places an emphasis on issues important to the province is necessary if either party wants to compete with the Liberals in Quebec. While winning in Quebec is much more important to the long-term competitiveness of the NDP, the Conservatives have a leadership selection process that does more to encourage candidates to appeal to the interests of Quebecois voters.

It is rare that the Liberals win elections without strong support in Quebec. In Canada’s history, the party has only won government four times and majorities three times without winning a majority of seats in the province. Because the Liberals are weak in Western Canada, they need a large number of Quebec seats to win elections. Outside of the 1990s, when the party took almost every Ontario seat, the Liberals have never been dominant enough on Ontario to win governments on the support of that region alone. Because the NDP are also fairly weak in Western Canada (at least outside of British Columbia) they need to be successful in Quebec in order to move beyond third party status. It is no coincidence that the party won official opposition status when they won large numbers of Quebec seats for the first time in 2011. The Conservatives’ strong Western support makes Quebec far less essential to their success than for the Liberals or NDP. That being said, a Conservative party that is competitive in Quebec would present a serious challenge for the Liberals, and potentially undermine the electoral coalition the Liberals need to win government.

Despite the parties’ need to win votes in Quebec, the NDP’s rules for leadership elections leave a danger that a candidate with little support in the province could become leader. The party uses a one-member one-vote ranked ballot system. NDP members have equal voting power regardless of which region of the country they come from. As a result, regions with particularly large numbers of NDP members will be particularly influential in the leadership election, and regions with few members will have little influence over who will become leader. This could be a problem for the NDP in Quebec because it does not have a long history of success in the province, and as a result, is not likely to have a large number of members in the province. Prior to 2011 the party have never held more than one seat in the province and, despite the fact that the federal NDP is closely linked to its provincial counter-parts, the Quebec NDP was just re-registered as a provincial political party in 2014 and has never been a serious factor in provincial elections.

It is likely that Quebec will be under-represented amongst NDP voters when the party picks its new leader in October. Regions that have had a more established NDP presence are likely to make up a greater share of the party membership and thus a greater share of the leadership race voters. A leadership candidate that builds a strong base of support in places where the NDP has been historically strong, such as British Columbia and Ontario, could win the leadership on the strength of the disproportionate number of NDP members who likely live in those regions. The result could be an under-emphasis of the importance of selecting a leader who is fluently bilingual and who has a strong understanding of Quebec politics.

The Conservatives’ leadership election is more likely to select a leader who is more sensitive to the needs of different regions. Unlike the NDP’s one member one vote rules, the Conservatives use a system that weights votes by riding. Every riding is given the same weight in the leadership contest regardless of how many Conservative members live in it. While this increases the voting power of individuals living in ridings with few Conservative members, it also increases the likelihood that the Conservatives will choose a leader that reflects the interests of different regions in the country. It is not sufficient for a Conservative leader to build a strong base of supporters in places such as the prairies and Southern Ontario where there are large numbers of Conservative members. Thus Conservatives leadership hopefuls have demonstrate an appeal in regions that are not traditionally Conservative, like Quebec.

This electoral system makes it more likely that a leader with appeal in less traditionally Conservative parts of the country will be elected leader. A candidate like Maxime Bernier, if he could build a coalition of Quebecois and Ontario Conservatives, could win the leadership and then challenge the Liberals in ridings where the Conservatives have not traditionally been strong. A candidate favoured only by Western and Southern Ontarian voters might not have the same ability to reach beyond Conservative strongholds and grow the party, and therefore might have difficulty winning in enough ridings to win the leadership race. The Conservatives’ leadership election rules are designed to disadvantage a leader with limited ability to reach beyond the parties’ regional bases of support.

There is an irony in the Conservative and NDP leadership races in that the party the more reliant on winning votes in Quebec has a leadership selection system that does less to force leadership candidates to reach out to Quebecers and win their support. Unless the NDP has been able to translate its success in 2011 into a large membership base in the province, it is likely that the NDP leadership that Ontarians and British Columbians will have a very large say in who becomes leader of the party. That may result in a leadership race where issues related particularly important to Quebec are less prominent in the race than they should be. In contrast the Conservatives have a selection process that forces candidates to reach out and win votes in regions where the party has not been traditionally successful, like Quebec. The result is that the Conservatives are more likely to select a leader that has broad-based regional appeal.

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